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Social networks continuously change as people create new ties and break exist-
ing ones. It is widely noted that our social embedding exerts strong influence
on what information we receive, and how we form beliefs and make decisions.
However, most studies overlook the dynamic nature of social networks, and its
role in fostering adaptive collective intelligence. It remains unknown (1) how
network structures adapt to the performances of individuals, and (2) whether
this adaptation promotes the accuracy of individual and collective decisions.
Here, we answer these questions through a series of behavioral experiments
and simulations. Our results reveal that groups of people embedded in dynamic
social networks can adapt to biased and non-stationary information environ-
ments. As a result, individual and collective accuracy is substantially improved
over static networks and unconnected groups. Moreover, we show that groups
in dynamic networks far outperform their best-performing member, and that
even the best member’s judgment substantially benefits from group engage-
ment. Thereby, our findings substantiate the role of dynamic social networks
as adaptive mechanisms for refining individual and collective judgments.
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Intelligent systems, both natural and artificial, rely on feedback, empirical learning, and ad-
aptation (1). Such systems are widespread, and can often be viewed as networks of interacting
entities that dynamically evolve over time. Cell reproduction, for example, relies on protein
networks to combine sensory inputs into gene expression choices adapted to environmental con-
ditions (2). Neurons in the brain dynamically rewire for human learning (3). Animal swarms
modify their connectivity to enhance their collective intelligence (4). Dynamic interaction net-
works have been shown to promote human cooperation (5), and culture transmission networks
over generations enabled human groups to develop technologies above any individual’s capab-
ilities (6). In the artificial realm, prominent machine learning algorithms rely on similar logics,
where dynamically updated networks integrate input signals into useful output (7,8). Across the
board, networks’ dynamic properties embody key mechanisms that enable systems to adapt to
environmental changes (9, 10).
In our view, the information processing capabilities of interacting human groups are no ex-
ception. People’s behavior, opinion formation, and decision-making are deeply rooted in cumu-
lative bodies of social information (11), accessed through social networks formed by choices
of whom we friend (12, 13), follow (14), call (15, 16), imitate (17, 18), trust (19, 20), and co-
operate with (5, 21, 22). Moreover, peer choices are frequently revised, most often based on
notions of peer success and reliability, or approximations such as reputation, popularity, and
socio-demographics (23–27).
It is widely noted, however, that social influence strongly correlates individuals’ judgment
in estimation tasks (28–31), compromising the first of two assumptions underlying common
statistical accounts of ‘wisdom-of-crowds’ phenomena (32): namely, that (i) individual estim-
ates are uncorrelated, or negatively correlated, and (ii) individuals are correct in mean expect-
ation (31, 33). In recent years, numerous studies have offered conflicting findings, showing
that social interaction can either significantly benefit group and individual estimates (30,34,35),
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or, conversely, lead them astray by inducing social bias, herding, and group-think (28, 29, 31).
Notably, both theoretical and experimental work has been limited mainly to frameworks where
agents are randomly placed in static social structures—dyads (34, 36), groups (29, 35, 37), or
networks (30, 31)—and has found that these divergent effects are a function of whether well-
informed individuals are placed in prominent positions in the network structure (30, 31), and
how self-confident they are (34, 36, 38).
However, unlike what is assumed in most existing work, the social networks we live in are
not random or imposed by external forces, but emerge shaped by endogenous social processes
and gradual evolution. The present study builds on the observation that agent characteristics,
such as skill and information access, are not randomly located in network structures. Instead,
their distribution is often the outcome of social heuristics that form and break ties influenced by
social cues (23,24,39). Intuitively, groups can benefit from awarding centrality to and amplifying
the influence of well-informed individuals. Hence we hypothesize that dynamic social influence
networks may be central to human collective intelligence, acting as core mechanisms by which
crowds, which may not initially be wise, evolve into wisdom, adapting to biased and potentially
non-stationary information environments.
To test these hypotheses, we developed a web-based experiment that allows us to identify the
role of dynamic networks in fostering an adaptive ‘wisdom of crowds.’ Participants (n = 719)
from Amazon Mechanical Turk (population details in SI) engaged in a sequence of 20 estimation
tasks. Each task consisted of estimating the correlation of a scatter plot, and monetary prizes
were awarded in proportion to performance. Participants were randomly allocated to groups of
12 (n = 60 groups), and each group was randomized to one of three treatment conditions: a solo
condition, where each individual solved the sequence of tasks in isolation; a static condition,
in which participants were randomly placed in static communication networks; and a dynamic
condition, in which participants at each round were allowed to select up to three neighbors to
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communicate with. Fig. 1A illustrates the experiment flow according to each condition. At each
round, participants were initially asked to submit an independent guess. Then those in static
and dynamic conditions entered a social exposure stage, where they could observe the answers
of their network peers, update their own, and see peers’ updates in real time. After submitting
a final guess, participants in all conditions were shown feedback on their score and the correct
answer. Lastly, those in the dynamic condition were shown scores of all participants and allowed
to revise which peers to follow in subsequent rounds.
The estimation task was designed so that it allowed manipulation of the quality of informa-
tion provided to participants. Scatter plots with three levels of difficulty were used (varying the
number of points, and adding outliers or non-linearities; see Figure 1B). At every round, all plots
seen by participants shared an identical true correlation, but difficulty levels could differ among
them (40). The design allowed the simulation of a shock to the distribution of information among
participants. Specifically, each participant experienced a constant difficulty level across the first
ten rounds; then, at round eleven, we introduced shocks by reshuffling difficulties to new levels
that remained constant thereafter. Participants were not informed about the difficulty levels they
or their peers faced.
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Task 
Stage 1:
All conditions
Social  learning
Stage 2:
Network conditions
Performance
Stage 3:
All conditions
Your answer: 0.3
Correct answer: 0.4
You earned: $0.9
Rewiring
Stage 4: 
Dynamic network condition
follow/unfollow
Solo Static network Dynamic networkExperimental conditions
Easy Hard
r = 0.09 r = 0.09
r = 0.78 r = 0.78 r = 0.78
A
B
r = 0.09
Medium
Figure 1: Experimental design. Panel (A) shows an illustration of the experiment design. Panel
(B) illustrates examples of the scatter plots used in the experiment. For any given round, all
participants saw plots that shared an identical true correlation, but difficulty levels could differ
among them. Participants were not informed about the difficulty level they or other participants
were facing.
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Results
Individual and collective outcomes
We first compared individual- and group-level errors across conditions. Evolutionary reasoning
suggests that people’s propensity to imitate follows from its direct benefits to the individual,
but it may, nonetheless, induce benefits to the population as a whole (39). Fig. 2 shows the
individual and group error rates of the static and dynamic conditions—using the arithmetic mean
as group estimate—normalized with respect to baseline errors in the solo condition. Overall, we
find that participants in dynamic networks achieved the lowest error rates, averaging 33% lower
individual error (P < 10−5), and 34% lower group error, compared to participants in static
networks (P < 10−4). In particular, the performance edge of groups in dynamic networks
was larger in periods where networks had adapted to their information environment (rounds
[6, 10] ∪ [16, 20], the ‘adapted periods’), reducing individual error by 45% (P < 10−10) and
group error by 47% (P < 10−10) compared to groups connected by static networks. Hence,
these results support our primary hypothesis that dynamic networks’ adaptiveness can benefit
both individual and collective judgment.
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Figure 2: Individual and collective outcomes. Groups connected by dynamic influence net-
works incur substantially lower individual errors (P < 10−5) as shown in Panel (A) and col-
lective errors (P < 0.001) in Panel (B). The reduction is notably larger and more significant
in periods where networks had adapted to the information environment (i.e., rounds [6, 10] and
[16, 20]). Errors are normalized with respect to average errors in the solo condition. Statistics on
individual-level outcomes are based on White cluster-robust standard errors. Error bars indicate
95% confidence intervals.
Adaptive Mechanisms
Two social mechanisms underlie the favorable performance of networked groups. First, dynamic
networks adaptively centralized over high-performing individuals. This behavior was predicted
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by abundant evidence from cognitive science and evolutionary anthropology, which indicate that
people naturally engage in selective social learning (6,23,39)—i.e., the use of social cues related
to peer competence and reliability to choose whom we pay attention to and learn from select-
ively. Figs. 3A and 3B show that participants in dynamic networks consistently used peers’
past performance information as success cues to guide their peer choices. As rounds elapsed,
performance information accrued, and social networks evolved from fully distributed into net-
works that amplified the influence of well-informed individuals. Upon receiving an information
shock, the networks slightly decentralized, entering a transient exploration stage before finding
a configuration adapted to the new distribution of information among participants (see Fig. 4).
8
Ne
tw
or
k 
Ce
nt
ra
liz
at
io
n
Pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
/p
op
ula
rit
y
co
rre
lat
io
n
Co
nf
id
en
ce
/a
cc
ur
ac
y 
co
rre
lat
io
n
A
B
C
Initial learning Adapted network Shock confusion Adapted network
Shock
Rounds [Dynamic network condition]
Figure 3: Mechanisms promoting collective intelligence in dynamic networks. Panel
(A) shows that the network becomes more centralized with time (Freeman global centraliza-
tion—i.e., how far the network is from a star network). Panel (B) depicts the relation between
performance (i.e., average error) and popularity (i.e., number of followers). Panel (c) shows
the relationship between accuracy of initial estimate and confidence (i.e., resistance to social
influence). Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
A centralization mechanism alone could suggest that group members may merely follow
and imitate the best individual among them, hence bounding collective performance by that of
the group’s top performer. However, research on the two-heads-better-than-one effect indic-
ates that, in the simpler case of dyads, even the best individual can benefit from social inter-
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action (34, 36); and that the critical mechanism enabling this effect is a positive relationship
between individuals’ accuracy and their confidence. Fig. 4C shows that participants in dynamic
networks had, overall, a positive correlation between the accuracy of their initial estimates and
their self-confidence (measured in terms of resistance to social influence). Participants were
likely to rely on private judgments whenever these were accurate and likely to rely on social in-
formation otherwise. Fig. 4C also shows that, as rounds elapsed, participants used task feedback
to calibrate their accuracy-confidence relation gradually, and were able to readapt gradually upon
the shock. Consistent with prior literature (30, 38), a positive correlation of confidence and ac-
curacy was found in static networks too (see S18 in SI), explaining their favorable performance
compared to unconnected groups.
Round 1 Round 3 Round 8 Round 10
Round 11 Round 13 Round 18 Round 20
Shock [changing the distribution of information quality]
6
3 Popularity
0
8
PerformanceHighLow Correlation Estimate
Initial
Revised
Truth
Figure 4: An illustrative example of the network dynamics. The circle color represents per-
formance. The size of each circle represents the number of followers (i.e., popularity). The
dashed orange line is the distribution of estimates prior to social influence, the blue solid line
is the distribution of post-social influence estimates, while the dashed vertical line is the true
correlation.
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Mean-Variance Trade-off
The joint effect of centralization and confidence mechanisms explains the adaptive advantage of
dynamic networks. Moreover, it suggests that their collective performance may not be bounded
by that of the best individual, and that even the best individual may benefit from network inter-
action. To test these implications, we generalize the use of group means as collective estimates,
common in ‘wisdom of crowds’ studies, and analyze the performance of top-k estimates—that
is, collective estimates where only the guesses of the k best-performing group members are
averaged. Top-k subsets within each group were computed based on post-hoc individual per-
formances across all rounds. In particular, top-12 estimates correspond to the group mean, and
top-1 to estimates of the group’s best-performing individual. Fig. 5 reports the mean and stand-
ard deviation of estimation errors incurred by top-k estimates during the adapted periods. Ideal
estimates would minimize both mean error and variability, approaching the lower left end of the
trade-off space.
The shape of top-k curves reveals that, as we remove low-performing individuals (from k =
12 to k = 1), estimates initially improve in both mean and standard deviation. Then, as we
further curate the crowd beyond k = 6, top-k estimates trade off between decreasing mean error
and increasing variability, and finally regress in both objectives as k → 1. Comparison across
conditions shows that, for any k ∈ [1, 12], dynamic influence networks improved estimation
errors in terms of both mean and standard deviation. In particular, Fig. 5 shows that the full-
group average in dynamic networks got 28% lower error and 48% less variability than the best
individual in the solo groups (dynamic top-12 vs. solo top-1; P < 10−2). Moreover, even the
best individual derived substantial benefits from social interaction, averaging 32% lower error
and 38% less variability when forming and revising social connections rather than working in
isolation (dynamic top-1 vs. solo top-1; P < 10−2).
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Figure 5: Mean-variance trade-off. Mean and standard deviation of absolute errors incurred
by top-k estimates during the adapted periods (rounds ∈ [6, 10] ∪ [16, 20]). Top-12 estimates
correspond to the full-group mean, and top-1 to the group’s best individual. Within each con-
dition, top-k trade-off curves first gain in both objectives, then trade off lower average error for
higher variability, and finally regress in both objectives as k → 1. Across conditions, for any
k ∈ [1, 12], groups in the dynamic condition outperformed groups in the static and solo condi-
tions. Moreover, the full-group mean of dynamic networks averaged 28% lower error and 48%
less variability than the best individual playing solo (dynamic top-12 vs. solo top-1; P < 10−2);
and the best individual in the dynamic condition averaged 32% lower error and 38% less vari-
ability than her analogue in solo (dynamic top-1 vs. solo top-1; P < 10−2). Bars indicate 95%
confidence intervals.
Quality of Performance Feedback
We implemented numerical simulations to explore the interaction between the quality of per-
formance feedback and the adaptability of dynamic networks. We simulated interacting agents
that update beliefs according to a DeGroot model (41), and rewire social connections according
to a performance-based preferential attachment process (see Section S7). Results of these sim-
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ulations corroborate our experimental results. Dynamic networks adapted to shocks by shifting
influence weight to agents with better information, substantially decreasing individual and group
error. Moreover, simulation results show that accurate peer performance information is neces-
sary for enabling beneficial group adaptation by means of social rewiring. Figure S19 shows
that, as we add increasing noise of peer performance information, the collective performance of
adaptive networks deteriorates until converging to that of the simple wisdom of crowds.
Lastly, we explore through simulation the interaction between network learning rates—a
network’s sensitivity to changes in agents’ performance—and the arrival rate of environmental
shocks (Fig. S20). Networks with faster learning rates could adapt to environments with fre-
quent information shocks. Conversely, networks with slower learning rates could leverage longer
learning periods, eventually achieving lower error rates in environments with infrequent shocks.
This short-term versus long-term accuracy trade-off implies that optimal network learning rates
depend on the pace at which the information environment changes, analogous to notions of
optimal learning rates in natural systems and artificial intelligence algorithms (7, 42).
Discussion
Existing work on collective intelligence and social influence has not considered the rewiring
of influence networks, a phenomenon that is widespread in natural situations. We have shown
that dynamic influence networks can adapt to biased and non-stationary environments, indu-
cing individual and collective beliefs even far more accurate than the independent beliefs of the
best-performing individual. Yet, we also showed that the advantages of adaptive networks are
contingent on the quality of peer performance information.
The insights here provided suggest design guidelines germane to real-world collective intel-
ligence mechanisms, in contexts such as commodity markets, social trading platforms, crowd-
funding, crowd work, prediction markets, and online education (e.g., MOOCs). We expect the
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adaptive systems view on collective intelligence to further sprout connections with fields such
as evolutionary biology and artificial intelligence, advancing an interdisciplinary understanding
and design of social systems and their information affordances.
Methods
We recruited 720 participants using Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT; see Supplementary In-
formation). Following a between-subjects design, each subject participated only once, was
randomly assigned to one of the three conditions, and did not know that other conditions ex-
isted. Participants interacted anonymously over the Internet using web-application playable in a
browser window. Consistent with standard payment rates on AMT, participants received a show-
up fee of $2.0, and then had the opportunity to earn an additional bonus of up to $8 based on
their performance in the game–average hourly pay of $15. We excluded one participant from our
analysis who was assigned to the solo (control) condition and dropped from the game without
completing any of the tasks. Consequently, the analysis of this study is based on 719 valid par-
ticipants. No statistical methods were used to predetermine sample size. The investigators were
not blinded to allocation during analysis.
Participants were randomly allocated into groups of size 12, and each group was randomized
to one of three treatment conditions: a solo condition, where each individual solved the sequence
of tasks in isolation; a static condition, in which participants were randomly placed in static
communication networks; and a dynamic condition, in which participants at each round were
allowed to select up to three neighbors to communicate with. The initial communication network
for the static and dynamic conditions were the same (i.e., each participant had three random
incoming edges and three random outgoing ones). At each round, participants were initially
asked to submit an independent guess. Then those in static and dynamic conditions entered
a social exposure stage, where they could observe the answers of their network peers, update
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their own and see peers’ updates in real time. After submitting a final guess, participants in
all conditions were shown feedback on their score and the correct answer. Lastly, those in the
dynamic condition were shown scores of all participants and allowed to revise which peers to
follow in subsequent rounds.
Our experimental task consisted of estimating the correlation from a scatter plot. Participants
engaged in 20 correlation estimation tasks. The correlation estimation task was designed so
that it allowed manipulation of the task difficulty. We manipulated the difficulty of a scatter
plot by varying the number of points, adding outliers, or non-linear relationship between the
two variables (see Supplementary Information for visual examples). At every round, all plots
seen by participants shared an identical true correlation (i.e., the correct answer for everyone
is the same), but difficulty levels could differ among them. The design allowed the simulation
of a shock to the participants. Specifically, each participant experienced a constant difficulty
level across the first ten rounds; then, at round eleven, we introduced shocks by reshuffling
difficulties to new levels that remained constant after that. Participants were not informed about
the difficulty levels they or their peers faced.
To evaluate the difference in performance between the different treatment conditions, we
used a treatment dummy to estimate a linear regression for the average normalized error (i.e.,
the average across the 20 rounds). We examined the effects at two levels of analyses: individual
outcomes (i.e., one data point per user; n = 719); and 2) group-level outcomes (i.e., one data point
per-group). Statistics on individual-level outcomes are based on White cluster-robust standard
errors to account for correlated error terms within each group. Statistics on group-level outcomes
are based on two-tailed t-test. We also performed various statistical robustness checks (see
Supplementary Information).
The study was reviewed and approved by the Committee on the Use of Humans as Exper-
imental participants (COUHES) at MIT. All participants provided an explicit consent to parti-
15
cipants in this study and COUHES approved the consent procedure.
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1 Experimental Setup
We aim at causal identification of the role of dynamic networks in fostering an adaptive ‘wisdom
of crowds’. For this, we conducted an experiment with real monetary stakes, where:
• The core estimation task of the experiment is a ‘Guess the correlation’ game, where par-
ticipants are shown a scatter plot of two variables and asked to estimate their correlation
(See Section 1.2.2 in the SI).
• We randomly form groups (three conditions) and ask participants to engage in a sequence
of 20 correlation tasks.
• The experiment tests three treatment conditions, building up from the ‘wisdom of the
crowd’ to the ‘wisdom of dynamic networks’ (See Figure S3) :
– Independent Estimates [Wisdom of Crowds]: Participants make independent es-
timates about the correlation of two variables. This condition corresponds to the
baseline wisdom of the crowd context (more details in section 1.2.3).
– Social Learning [Wisdom of Static Networks]: Participants make independent es-
timates, but then engage in a stage of active social learning, where they are exposed
to the estimates of their ego-network peers in real time. This context is analogous
to that studied by work at the intersection of the ‘wisdom of crowds’ and social
learning (more details in section 1.2.4).
– Selective Social Learning [Wisdom of Dynamic Networks]: This condition builds
on condition (2), and adds the possibility for participants to choose and periodically
reevaluate who to follow and be influenced by. After each task round, participants
are shown performance information of all peers in the group, and are allowed to
follow/unfollow a bounded number of peers (more details in section 1.2.5).
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• The experiment is designed to expose the role of dynamic social learning networks as
fundamental mechanisms that allow collective intelligent systems to adapt to changes in
their environment:
– In guess the correlation tasks, for any given correlation value we can regulate the
amount and structure of information provided to each participant and manipulate it
over time by implementing three difficulty levels: easy, medium, hard. Addition
details in section 1.2.2.
– For example, the number of points, existence of outliers, non-linear structures
– In every round, the correct answer of the correlation was always identical, but the
difficulty level could differ between participants.
– We provide a change in the environment at round 10 (we call it a shock) and thereby
we simulate non-stationary distributions of information among participants.
• We ran the experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 720) where participants were
rewarded based on their performance:
– Participants received noncompetitive monetary incentives for good individual guesses.
– The rewards applied to all rounds to make sure that individuals took all of their
decisions seriously.
– The incentives trigger the ability to use information of others only for improving
own estimates to get closer to the truth and not for aligning with others for the sake
of conformity.
– Mentioned the numerical simulation
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1.1 Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
Amazons Mechanical Turk (http://mturk.com) is an online labor market with a large and diverse
pools of people ready to promptly perform tasks for pay (called human intelligence tasks, or
HITs). Typical tasks include image labeling, sentiment analysis, or classification of URLs.
Additionally, Mechanical Turk is increasingly becoming a popular tool for behavioral scientists
as well. Studies from across the social sciences have systematically replicated classic results
from psychology and economics with data obtained from such online labor markets and deemed
online experiments to be as reliable as that obtained via traditional methods (1–5). Accordingly,
we posted each of our experimental sessions as an external HIT (a URL of our web application,
is displayed in a frame in the Worker’s web browser) and recruited workers to participate in the
experiment. Workers could choose to accept the HIT, at which point the work was officially
assigned to them and they could begin participating in the study.
1.2 Experiment design
In this section, we present the design of our experiments conducted online with a sample of
participants recruited via MTurk. Our experiment follows the between-group design and imple-
ments a repeated ’Guess the Correlation Game’, where participants are shown a scatter plot of
two variables and asked to estimate their correlation.
1.2.1 Participant Recruitment
All participants were recruited on MTurk by posting a HIT for the experiment, entitled “Guess
the correlation and win up to $10”, a neutral title that was accurate without disclosing the
purpose of the experiment. The study (Approval#: 1509172301) was reviewed and approved
by the Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental participants (COUHES) at MIT. All
participants provided an explicit consent to participants in this study and COUHES approved
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the consent procedure. All data collected in the experiment could be associated only with
participant’s Amazon Worker ID on MTurk, not with any personally-identifiable information.
All players remain anonymous for the entire study. Descriptive statistics on the participants is
shown in Figure S1. At the beginning of a session, participants read on-screen instructions for
the condition they are randomly assigned to (more details on conditions later) and could start
the experiment only once they have completed a set of comprehension questions.
Solo condition Static network condition Dynaimc network condition
Figure S1: The gender, education, and age breakdowns for our recruited participants via
Amazon Mechanical Turk. participants were assigned to their condition randomly.
1.2.2 Guess the Correlation Task
participants were prompted to estimate the correlation from a scatter plot (namely, ‘Guess the
correlation’ game) and were awarded a monetary prize based on the accuracy of their final
estimate. This estimation task is designed to expose the mechanisms that allow intelligent
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systems to adapt to changes in their information environment. We can influence the performance
level of participants by implementing three difficulty levels (e.g., adjusting the number of points
or linearity): easy, medium, and hard. In every round, the correct answer of the correlation was
always identical, but the difficulty level could differ between participants. The difficulty level
that each member experienced remained constant across the first 10 rounds. Then we simulate
a shock after round 10 by changing the difficulty levels for the remaining of the experiment.
Participants were not informed about the difficulty level they or other participants were facing.
Example of the scatter plots used in the experiment are shown in Figure S2.
Easy Hard
r = 0.09 r = 0.09
r = 0.78 r = 0.78 r = 0.78
r = 0.09
Medium
Figure S2: Example of the scatter plots used in the experiment.
1.2.3 Condition 1: Solo [Wisdom of Crowds]
In this condition participants make independent guesses about the correlation of two variables
(See figure S3). Once an independent guess had been made, the participant learned the result
of that round (i.e., how much they earned, what was the correct correlation). In this condition,
there was no social information about the performance and estimates of the others.
6
Collective estimates are then formed by taking averages of individual estimates. This con-
dition corresponds to the traditional ‘wisdom of the crowds’ context (6–8).
1.2.4 Condition 2: Social Learning [Wisdom of Static Networks]
In this condition participants make an independent guess, but then engage in a stage of act-
ive social learning, where they are exposed to their ego-network’s estimates in real time. In
particular, in this condition each round consists of three stages (as illustrated in Figure S3):
1. Initial stage: participants make an initial independent guess.
2. Interactive stage: Participants observe the guesses of 3 of their randomly selected neigh-
bors (fixed for the entire experiment) and can update their guess to accommodate the
information and experiences, the opinions and judgments, the stubbornness and confid-
ence, of the other players. Note that participants observe in real-time the estimates of the
other participants that they are connected to and can update their estimates multiple times
before they submit their final estimate.
3. Round Outcome: In the round outcome, the participant is shown the correct answer and
how much they earned in the last round and cumulatively. participants do not see any
performance information regarding their neighbors.
This context is analogous to that studied by work at the intersection of the ‘wisdom of
crowds’ and social learning, such as (9–13).
1.2.5 Condition 3: Selective Social Learning [Wisdom of Dynamic Networks]
This condition builds on the static network condition, and adds the possibility for participants
to choose and periodically reevaluate who to follow and be influenced by (see Figure S3). After
each task round, participants are shown performance information of all peers in the group, and
7
are allowed to follow/unfollow a bounded number them. In this experiment, the maximum
number of outgoing connections is three.
Task and 
private signals
( )
Social 
learning
( )
Truth and 
performance( ),  ( )
( ) ω( )
Task and 
private signals
( )
( )
Truth and 
performance( ),  ( )
ω( )
Task and 
private signals
( )
Social 
learning
( )
Truth and 
performance( ),  ( )
Influence 
rewiring
β( ),  α( )
( ) ω( )
Solo Static Dynamic
A B
C
Figure S3: Illustration of the experimental conditions. Panel (A) depicts the Solo condition
(i.e., no social information) where participants make independent estimates. This condition
corresponds to the baseline wisdom of the crowd context. Panel (B) describes the Static net-
work condition (i.e., social learning) where participants engage in a stage of interactive social
learning, where they are exposed to the estimates of a fixed set of peers in real time. Panel (C)
describes the Dynamic network (i.e., selective social learning) condition that adds the possibility
for participants to choose who to follow and be influenced by in the next round.
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2 Game Screenshots
Figure S4: Illustration of the consent form presented to the participants. The study (Approval#:
1509172301) was reviewed and approved by the Committee on the Use of Humans as Ex-
perimental participants (COUHES) at MIT. All participants provided an explicit consent to
participants in this study and COUHES approved the consent procedure.
Figure S5: Participants in all conditions make independent guesses about the correlation of two
variables independently.
9
Figure S6: Participants in the Static and Dynamic network condition engage in a an active social
learning phase, where they are exposed to their ego-network’s estimates in real time.
Figure S7: After each task round, participants in the Dynamic network conditions are shown
performance information of all peers in the group, and are allowed to follow/unfollow a bounded
number them. In this experiment, the maximum number of outgoing connections is three.
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3 Individual-Level Accuracy
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Figure S8: Dynamic social influence benefits the performance of individuals in the crowd.
(A) Kernel Density Estimate (KDE) of participants’ individual performance (i.e., average error
across all rounds) for the three experimental conditions. We find that participants in groups con-
nected by dynamic influence networks (Dynamic condition) achieved 38% reduction in average
error compared to participants in unconnected groups (Solo condition), and 12% reduction in
average error compared to participants in groups connected by static influence networks (Static
condition). Panel (B) compares the average performance of individuals across conditions. Two-
sample t-tests show a significant difference between the average individual error of participants
in the Solo and Static conditions (P < 0.0001), as well as between participants in the Static and
Dynamic conditions (P < 0.001). Panel (C) compares the standard deviation of participant’s
individual performance across conditions, and shows that individual performance in groups con-
nected by dynamic influence networks was, not only better on average, but also substantially
more equal on its distribution among group members.
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AB
Initial guess Revised guess
All rounds
Adapted rounds
KD
E
KD
E
Figure S9: Panel (A) shows individual errors in the full game and Panel (B) shows the error
in the adapted period (i.e., periods [6-10] and [16-20]). The error for the initial guess in both
panels is the same across conditions, however, the dynamic network condition incurs much
lower errors in the adapted periods (as in Panel B).
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Figure S10: Panel (A) shows the errors before the interactive estimation phase (i.e, pre-social
learning). Panel (B) shows the errors after the participants revised their estimates in the static
and dynamic network conditions (i.e., post-social learning).
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Figure S11: The distribution of pre-social learning and post-social learning for the three condi-
tions.
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4 Collective Accuracy
Figure S12: Dynamic social influence effect in individual rounds: Adaptive with time and
reduces individual error. All error rates are post-social learning errors.
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5 Network Analysis
Po
pu
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ity
Rounds
Figure S13: The in-degree distribution at each round (dynamic condition). We see that starting
from a fully distributed network (everyone having the same in-degree) the network becomes
more centralized over the course of the experiment.
15
Network (global) Centralization measure: We measure network centralization by calculating
the sum in differences in centrality between the most central node in the network and all other
nodes; and then divide this quantity by the theoretically largest such sum of differences in a star
network of the same size
Cx =
∑N
i=1Cx(p∗)− Cx(pi)
max
∑N
i=1Cx(p∗)− Cx(pi)
Co
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Figure S14: (A) The network becomes more centralized with time, and (B) the correlation
between the node performance and popularity increases as the game progresses.
16
10
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e_
sc
or
e
round_id = 1
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
round_id = 2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
round_id = 3
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
round_id = 4
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
round_id = 5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e_
sc
or
e
round_id = 6
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
round_id = 7
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
round_id = 8
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
round_id = 9
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
round_id = 10
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e_
sc
or
e
round_id = 11
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
round_id = 12
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
round_id = 13
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
round_id = 14
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
round_id = 15
2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
in_degree
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e_
sc
or
e
round_id = 16
2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
in_degree
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
round_id = 17
2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
in_degree
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
round_id = 18
2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
in_degree
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
round_id = 19
2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
in_degree
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
round_id = 20
Figure S15: The relationship between the number of followers (i.e., popularity) and the player’s
cumulative score (i.e., performance).
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6 Confidence and Accuracy Correlation
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Figure S16: The relationship between confidence (i.e., resistance to social influence) and accur-
acy of initial estimates for the static and dynamic conditions. Error bars in the dynamic/static
comparison (the bottom figure) are standard errors from the mean. All other errors are 95%
confidence intervals.
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6.1 Summary of Results and Main Findings
• Groups connected by dynamic influence networks (dynamic network condition) improve
participants’ individual performance over unconnected groups (solo condition), and groups
connected by static influence networks. Dynamic networks achieve better performance,
and more equally distributed. Figure S8:
– Participants in the Dynamic network achieved 38% reduction in average error com-
pared to participants in the Solo condition.
– Participants in the Dynamic network achieved 12% reduction in average error com-
pared to participants in the Static Network condition.
– Both differences are statistically significant at the 95% confidence levels while ac-
counting for within group dependencies.
– Not only better individual performance on average, but also substantially more
equal on its distribution among group members.
• Dynamic influence networks improve groups’ collective estimates (Wisdom of Dynamic
Networks) over the other conditions (Wisdom of Static Networks & Wisdom of Crowds).
– Collective estimates of the dynamic network condition incur substantially lower er-
rors in periods where the network has adapted ([6-10] and [16-20]):
∗ 54% lower than unconnected groups.
∗ 33% lower than groups connected by static influence networks
∗ 28% lower than the errors of the best performer in the solo condition.
– Even the top-performer in each group gets substantial benefits by joining a group
connected by dynamic networks, rather than working in isolation.
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• Dynamics of the Network: The adaptive mechanism in the dynamic network exploits the
higher performer individuals by centralizing the network around them. The popular and
high performer individuals before the shock are not the same as the ones after the shock.
• Dynamics on the Network: Another adaptive mechanism is the correlation between ac-
curacy of initial estimate and resistance to social influence. This allows even the best
individual to perform better (i.e., copy others when in doubt). This mechanism plays a
role in the static network condition S16.
• Mean-variance tradeoff. We study top-k estimates across conditions, which generalize
the traditional notion of group wisdom estimates, containing both group wisdom estim-
ates and best individual’s estimates as special cases (top-12 and top-1 respectively; see
Figure 5 in the main text of this paper).
– Results show that, as we remove low-performing individuals (decreasing k from
k = 12), top-k estimates initially improve in both mean and standard deviation;
then, as we further curate the crowd, top-k estimates tradeoff between decreasing
mean error and increasing its standard deviation; finally, top-k estimates disimprove
in both objectives as k → 1 and top-k approaches the estimates of the single best
individual.
– Comparison of top-k curves across conditions show that, for any k ∈ [1, 12], dy-
namic influence networks improved estimation errors in terms of both mean and
standard deviation over estimation errors of groups in the unconnected and static
network conditions.
• These results open the floor for discussion on:
– Adaptive systems as paradigm for collective intelligence systems: distributed and
20
non-stationary information environments, learning rates, availability of performance
information and social cues, etc.
– Fundamental difference and complementarity between aggregation strategies and
intervening the social system itself, towards improving collective intelligence sys-
tems.
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7 Numerical Model & Simulation
Analysis of the dynamic properties of Figure S3’s framework requires models of its human
components, i.e., the social learning and network rewiring heuristics. We model the former
as a DeGroot process (14), and propose a performance-based preferential detachment and at-
tachment model for the latter. This section describes such models and agents’ input private
signals.
Notation. Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} represent a group of agents that participate in a sequence of
tasks, indexed by discrete time t. Let G(N,E(t)) be a sequence of directed graphs representing
the influence network at each period t. Let e(t)ij ∈ [0, 1] denote the edge weight of (i, j) at time
t, and M (t) the row-normalized stochastic matrix associated with E(t), i.e., M (t)ij =
e
(t)
ij∑
h∈N e
(t)
ih
.
Agents receive private signals s(t)i ∈ [0, 1], for i ∈ N , regarding the true state of the world
ω(t) ∈ [0, 1]. Similarly, we denote agents’ post-social learning beliefs by p(t)i ∈ [0, 1], for i ∈ N .
Private Signals. We depart from the commonly made assumption of collective unbiased-
ness of agents’ private signals (7, 9, 11, 12, 15), allowing agents’ signals to be distributed with
arbitrary means and skewness. Let µi = E[si] denote the mean of agent i’s signal, and
µ¯ = 1
n
∑
i µi be the collective mean of private signals; we are interested on the more gen-
eral setting of information environments where µ¯ 6= ω, i.e., where the collective distribution of
initial signals is not centered on the truth. Figure S17 illustrates the difference between unbiased
and biased information environments.
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Biased Unbiased
Figure S17: Traditional accounts of ‘wisdom of crowds’ phenomena assume unbiased and stat-
istically independent signals among agents. In our model, we assume arbitrary (potentially
biased) initial signals.
7.1 Social Learning Process
Social learning is modeled as a DeGroot process (14), where each agent updates her belief by
taking weighted averages of her own belief (i.e., private signal) and the beliefs of neighboring
agents. DeGroot averaging as social learning heuristic has been well studied empirically and
theoretically (11,12), and shown to robustly describe real-world belief updating better than more
optimal rational Bayesian models (16). In particular, we model post-social learning beliefs as
the result of a two-stage DeGroot process on private signals, given by
p(t) =
(
M (t)
)2
s(t) (1)
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7.2 Individual and collective performance
Individual performance is evaluated based on the errors of post-social influence estimates.
Individual cumulative error is defined by:

(t)
i =
1
λ+ 1
∑
r∈[0,λ]
∣∣∣p(t−r)i − ω(t−r)∣∣∣,
where λ controls the number of retrospective periods that performance information is averaged
across.
Agents assess performance of other agents relative to the performance of the best agent in
the group. We define relative error of agent i as pi(t)i = 
(t)
i − (t)min , and denote the set of
performance information available to agent i at time t by vector Π(t)i ∈ [0, 1]n with elements
pi
(t)
ij =
{
pi
(t)
j for j 6= i
pi
(t)
si for j = i
where pi(t)si is the relative error of agent i’s private signal.
Collective error. We are interested on the wisdom of the dynamic network (WDN) error,
wdn, which captures collective error after selective social learning according to the interaction
network. We compare wdn against the wisdom of the crowd (WC) baseline, wc, which captures
collective error of the simple averaging of agents’ initial signals.

(t)
wdn =
∣∣ω(t) − 1
n
∑
i
p
(t)
i
∣∣ (2)
(t)wc =
∣∣ω(t) − 1
n
∑
i
s
(t)
i
∣∣ (3)
7.3 Influence Rewiring Process
Individuals connect by weighted influence links that are revised over time. We model influence
rewiring heuristics that strengthen links when a neighbor exhibits high performance and weaken
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or break links when a neighbor performs poorly. Agents can distribute attention among a lim-
ited number of peers, captured by parameter κ, which represents cognitive or infrastructure
constraints (e.g., limits on our ability to keep track of social information and relations (17)).
In particular, agents dynamically allocate κ ∈ N shares of their attention to other agents.
Let eijk ∈ {0, 1}, for k ∈ {1, 2, ..., κ}, indicate that i places attention share k on j, then
eij =
∑
k eijk and eij ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., κ}.
Probability of detachment. Probability that agent i detaches from j is a positive function
of i and j’s errors, and given by equation 4. For example, if i’s error is among the lowest of the
group (pi(t)i ≈ 0), i is unlikely to rewire her local network. Conversely, if i’s error is significant
(e.g., pi(t)i ≈ 1), i detaches from j with probability proportional to j’s error.
β
(t)
ij =
(
pi
(t)
i pi
(t)
ij
) 1
2
(4)
Probability of Attachment. High-performing agents are more likely to be followed. Ana-
logous to generalized preferential attachment (18), probability that agent i attaches to j is in-
versely proportional to j’s error, and given by
α
(t)
ij =
(
1− pi(t)ij
n−∑
j
pi
(t)
ij
)2
c (5)
where c is a normalization constant.
Network Evolution. Define i.i.d. random variables b(t)ijk ∼ Bernoulli
(
β
(t)
ij
) ∀(i, j, k), then
random variables b(t)ij =
∑
k b
(t)
ijke
(t)
ijk ∼ Binomial
(
e
(t)
ij , β
(t)
ij
)
indicate the amount of attention
shares that i detaches from j in period t. Define n-dimensional random vectors a(t)i ∼ Multi-
nomial
( ∑
j b
(t)
ij , α
(t)
i
)
, where α(t)i is i’s vector of attachment probabilities. Elements a
(t)
ij ∈
{0, 1, ..., κ} indicate the amount of shares that i attaches to j in period t , and network evolution
is given by
e
(t+1)
ij = e
(t)
ij − b(t)ij + a(t)ij ∀i, j (6)
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7.4 Results
7.4.1 Collective Error and Adaptability
Using the above-described model, we performed Monte Carlo simulations of a group of twenty
agents who participate in a sequence of estimation tasks, where agents can follow and be influ-
enced by a maximum number of five peers (κ = 5).
Figure S18A shows the evolution of dynamic networks’ estimates along the sequence of
tasks, and compares them against simple wisdom of the crowd estimates. Starting at t = 0, WC
and WDN estimates incur the same average error, equal to the bias of initial signals against the
true state of the world: E[(0)wc ] = E[
(0)
wdn] = |µ¯−w(0)|. As agents observe each others’ past per-
formance, and rewire local influence networks accordingly, those with better information gain
influence in the network, decreasing (t)wdn and stabilizing it substantially below 
(t)
wc. Difference
in means tests for each t show that E[(t)wdn] < E[
(t)
wc] for all t > 3 with a 95% confidence level.
WDN
WC
WC
WDN
Figure S18: Evolution of collective error: wisdom of the crowd (WC) and wisdom of the
dynamic network (WDN). Panel A) stationary distribution of information among agents. Panel
B) non-stationary information environment, shocks to the information distribution introduced
at t = {100, 200}
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We study as well how the dynamic agent network responds to environmental shocks. Fig-
ure S18B compares the dynamics of collective intelligence for WC and WDN under a non-
stationary environment, where shocks to the joint distribution of private signals p(t)s and truth
ω
(t)
s are introduced at t = {100, 200}. The dynamic network adapts to post-shock distribu-
tions by shifting influence to agents with better information in the post-shock environment,
driving collective error (t)wdn significantly below 
(t)
wc. Difference in means tests showed that
E[
(t)
wdn] < E[
(t)
wc] for all t ∈ {[3, 99] ∪ [140, 199] ∪ [225, 300]} with a 95% confidence level.
7.4.2 Feedback Quality and Performance
This section focuses on the role of feedback quality on the performance of the collective. This
is a realistic assumption as usually the environmental cues about performance can be noisy in
many cases. This leads to increasing the chance of picking the wrong individual to follow.
Indeed, we see in Figure S19 that as we increase the feedback noise level, the collective per-
formance degrades until it converges to the performance of the independent crowd.
[after shock]
Figure S19
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7.4.3 Rates of Learning and Environment Change
This section focuses on how the retrospective length of cumulative performance information,
parameterized by λ, affects the learning and adaptation rate of the network. Moreover, we study
the interaction effects that the network learning rate and the environment change rate have on
collective error.
A
B C
Figure S20: Panel (A): Learning rates associated to different λ’s, where colored bands show
95% confidence intervals. Panel (B): Effects of λ and ρ on collective error, where shades of
orange indicate time-averaged collective error. Panel (C): Effects of λ and ρ on collective error,
normalized per type of information environment (ρ column).
Figure S20A shows the after-shock evolution of collective errors for a set of λ’s. On average,
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small λ’s adapt significantly faster to new information environments, but eventually stabilize at
higher collective error levels compared to larger λ’s. This short-term versus long-term accuracy
tradeoff associated to the network learning rate implies that the optimal choice of λ depends on
the frequency of environment change.
We study such interaction by simulating non-stationary environments where random shocks
to the distribution of information among agents arrive according to a Bernoulli process with
average interarrival time ρ ∈ N. Figure S20B shows the time-averaged collective error of the
network for a grid of (ρ, λ) combinations. Figure S20C shows collective errors for the same
parameter grid, but normalized per type of information environment (ρ column).
We observe two main effects. First, for any given λ, the less frequent the environment
changes the better accuracy the network attains. Second, for any particular ρ, average collect-
ive error is a convex function of λ, where optimal λ’s balance short and long term accuracy in
accordance with the rate of environment change. Intuitively, networks facing stationary envir-
onments are best off accumulating performance information over the entire available history.
However, in the context of non-stationary environments with frequent shocks, networks are
better off restricting attention to performance information in the near past; while, similar to
stationary environments, networks facing moderately stationary environments benefit from ac-
cumulating performance over longer periods of time.
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